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Abstract
Recent judicial decisions and arbitral awards on maritime delimitation disputes have, to a 
considerable degree, clarified the ways by which maritime delimitation disputes may be resolved. 
The so-called three-stage approach has been fairly continuously followed by international tribunals. 
It is often suggested that, in international practice, islands have often been given reduced effect in 
comparison with land masses in terms of creating maritime zones and delimiting maritime boundary. 
In East Asia, there are some important territorial issues that certainly affect not only the delimitation 
of maritime boundaries in the region but also the allocation of natural resources such as gas and 
oil. Among these are the Northern Territories dispute between Japan and Russia, the Takeshima/
Dokdo (or Liancourt Rocks, in English) dispute between Japan and Korea, the Senkaku/Diaoyudao/
Diaoyutai Islands dispute between Japan and China, and the South China Sea Disputes. In each of 
these territorial and maritime disputes, the arguments employed by the parties involved include the 
applicability of major methodologies and approaches such as the natural prolongation theory, the 
equidistance/median line method, combined with relevant circumstances, and the legal status of an 
island under Article ???(?) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. At the same time, 
however, one should take into consideration some other unusual factors that are pertinent in this region 
such as the legal status of Taiwan as a party to a dispute, arguments regarding China?s historic rights, 
and the legacies of the end of the Second World War. Against this background, this article discusses, 
particularly, whether recent developments in maritime boundary delimitation have any implication 
for territorial and maritime boundary disputes in East Asia, the extent to which the judgments will 
resolve those disputes in the region, and whether any particular historic element in this region should 
be specifically considered. In sum, recent developments in jurisprudence in this field may have 
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limited implications in the settlement of territorial and maritime disputes in East Asia mainly due to 
the following three factors: (?) the legacy of the Second World War; (?) the lack of agreement among 
the states concerned to use a third-party mechanism for the settlement of the dispute; and (?) the 
experience of a more practical approach toward gaining immediate interests.
Key words:  maritime boundary delimitation, territorial disputes, East Asia, Northern Territories, 
Takeshima/Dokdo, Senkaku/Diaoyudao/Diaoyutai, South China Sea
1. Introduction
In East Asia, there are some unsettled territorial and maritime disputes over islands.2 Japan, 
for example, is engaged in three territorial disputes with neighbouring states over some islands.3 
These include the dispute with Russia over the so-called Northern Territories,4 the dispute with 
South Korea over Takeshima/Dokdo (or Liancourt Rocks, in English),5 and the dispute with China 
over the Senkaku/Diaoyudao/Diaoyutai Islands. The territorial and maritime disputes over the 
islands and maritime areas in the South China Sea identified as the Paracel Islands issue involving 
China, Taiwan, and Vietnam, and the Spratly Islands issue involving Brunei, China, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam6 ? are high-profile issues these days, while China becomes a 
rising sea power in the area and takes an assertive stance.
The main purpose of this article is to deal with the following question: Do recent 
developments in maritime delimitation have any implication for territorial and maritime boundary 
disputes in East Asia? In order to answer this question, the author should like to address two 
points: first, the current situation of the abovementioned disputes; and second, the implication(s), 
if any, of recent judicial and arbitral settlement of territorial and maritime disputes. Therefore, 
this article does not aim at dealing with, let alone determining, the ownership issue of the disputes 
mentioned above, though it may touch upon this issue in so far as it is necessary to address the 
main question mentioned above. 
2. Current Situations in East Asia
In East Asia, there are some differences of opinion among states over the legal status of 
baselines, bays, islands, and geographical features.7 The differing opinions have given rise to 
protests from other countries and others have become territorial and/or maritime disputes. This 
article starts with the northern part of this region, working in a southerly direction.
(1) Japan and Russia
Japan is engaged in a territorial dispute over the so-called Northern Territories8 with Russia, 
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which has been occupying these islands since the end of the Second World War. The dispute 
includes the conflicts between the two over the application and interpretation of the international 
instruments concluded during and after the Second World War, such as the ???? Yalta Agreement, 
the ???? San Francisco Peace Treaty, and the ???? Japan-Soviet Union Joint Declaration. It is 
noteworthy that one of the key issues of the dispute derives from the Peace Treaty?s failure not 
only to give the detailed definition and scope of the ?Kurile Islands? and but also to mention 
the recipient to whom Japan renounced the Islands. One can find a third party to some of these 
agreements, such as the United States, deeply involved in the entangled and complicated process 
of the negotiation and treaty-making. 
There is, basically, no maritime boundary dispute yet, since the territorial dispute concerning 
the attribution of sovereignty over the Islands has not been resolved between these two countries, 
despite the current high-profile news concerning the summit meeting between the leaders of these 
two countries in Japan at the end of ????.9 There is, however, a difference of opinion between the 
two states concerning the interpretation and application of the ???? Agreement between Japan 
and the former Soviet Union concerning the Mutual Relationship in Offshore Fishery, particularly 
in terms of the respective positions each state has taken over their respective exclusive economic 
zones (EEZ). As a case in point, Japan?s act of entering Russia?s EEZ (which was established 
around the coast of the disputed islands), with the payment of a certain fee for sharing the cost 
necessary to cover the Russian preservation measures is a non-recognition of the EEZ of Russia. 
It may be said that even under the current conditions, disputing countries can negotiate a 
bilateral agreement that there is a de facto maritime boundary in the maritime area of the disputed 
islands.10 
(2) Japan and South Korea
With respect to the territorial dispute between Japan and South Korea over Takeshima/
Dokdo,11 there seem to be three major issues between the two states: first, the historical 
foundations of their claims; second, the validity of Japan?s incorporation of the Island (or a group 
of islets) in ????; and third, the treatment of a series of international instruments, including the 
???? Cairo Declaration, which decided the disposition of the territories of Japan after the Second 
World War. As regards the first issue, one may say that the so-called historical facts in a dispute 
cannot objectively be evaluated without any help from a third party. Although each side maintains 
that its position is historically well founded, it does not seem to be easy to say that any side has 
fully met the requirement of effective occupation (effectivités) through the official channel of the 
states concerned,12 in the light of the evidence produced by them.
The ???? Cabinet Decision on Japan?s incorporation of the Island into the Shimane 
Prefecture tends to beg some questions as to its validity under international law. Though Japan, 
for its part, issued the Decision in order to ?reaffirm? its intention to claim sovereignty over the 
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Island, which had been established by the seventeenth century, those who support the position of 
South Korea maintain that this act by Japan shows that it had not assumed sovereignty over the 
Island until ????, as it deemed the Islands to be ?terra nullius?. However, the context and timing 
of this incorporation has been open to severe criticism, since, to some advocates, the incorporation 
seemed to have been done for military purposes before the preparation of Japan?s eventual 
annexation of the Korean peninsula in ????. From a Korean point of view, this may be regarded as 
the first step towards Japanese colonization of the Peninsula.
Moreover, one can also note that the interpretation and application of the ???? San Francisco 
Peace Treaty is at issue again because there is no reference to the Island in the territorial clauses 
of this Treaty, under which Japan renounced ?all right, title, and claim to Korea?.13 South Korea is 
of the view that there is no dispute over sovereignty of the Islands, as it has been occupying them 
since ????, when it unilaterally installed the so-called ?Rhee Syngman Line? to encompass them.14
The nature of the dispute is, thus, multifaceted: the dispute regards not only the attribution 
of territorial sovereignty and maritime delimitation between the states directly concerned, but also 
considers the consequences of the post Second World War territorial settlement and disposition 
with the involvement of a third party, whose significant role had an enormous, unpredicted impact 
on the future of this region. This latter point may sometimes be associated with the view that the 
Japanese claim over the Island, including its proposal to refer the dispute to the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ), is regarded as a revival of the image of Japanese colonialism.15
In the light of the Qatar v. Bahrain case of ???? and the Cameroon v. Nigeria case of 
????,16 however, the ICJ?s recent decisions may not be of great use, since it seems to have 
dissociated itself from a fundamental matter of colonialism. The Qatar v. Bahrain judgment seems 
to have thought much of the decision that had been made by Great Britain as a protecting power, 
principally relying on the ???? British decision regarding the attribution of sovereignty of the 
islands in question.17 The Cameroon v. Nigeria, on the other hand, did not dwell on the issue of 
British colonialism vis-à-vis the people of Bakassi and Nigeria. 
As regards delimiting the maritime boundary between Japan and South Korea, there arises 
the practical problem of the legal status of the Island as a point of reference. Since the size, 
location, and significance of the essentially uninhabited Island are not considerable, the boundary 
may basically be the median line between the two countries without considering the Island?s 
existence, as is often the precedence in the maritime delimitation cases decided by international 
tribunals. South Korea, however, has switched its position from regarding the Island as a rock to 
regarding it as an island.
In ????, the consultation meeting took place, where South Korea abruptly showed its 
stance with respect to delimiting the EEZ in the Sea of Japan.18 Thus, it used the Island as a point 
of reference in delimiting the EEZ. As Article ??? of the UNCLOS stipulates, only an island, 
irrespective of its size, is entitled to the EEZ and the continental shelf. The ICJ only has two 
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requirements for determining whether a geographical feature is an island: that it is ?naturally 
formed? and that it is ?above water at high tide?.19 On this point, Japan issued an order to enlarge its 
territorial waters by introducing a system of straight baselines at its ???? ratification of UNCLOS. 
However, this invited the protest of South Korea, which argued that the order contradicts with 
international law and violates the ???? Fisheries Agreement between the two countries.20
Nevertheless, these two countries have been successful so far in concluding two sets of 
agreements in ???? on the boundary of their adjacent continental shelf: one for the delimitation of 
the northern part of their continental shelf boundary on the basis of a median line, and the other 
for the establishment of a joint development zone on the southern part of their continental shelf. 
They also concluded a fishery agreement in ???? to govern fishing in demarcated ?provisional/
intermediate zones? in accordance with the principle of nationality. The latter agreement may be a 
good example of delimiting the EEZ between the disputing countries by way of a more pragmatic 
approach of sidestepping the disputed islands in order to gain immediate fishery interests, thus also 
enabling them to demarcate the continental shelf lying between them with a view to maintaining a 
friendly and cooperative relationship. 
Three sets of similar bilateral fishery agreements between Japan, China and South Korea ? 
the one between Japan and China, the one between Japan and South Korea and the one between 
China and South Korea ? are of practical interest to all of these countries in and around the 
maritime areas in the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea, in spite of some problems on the 
exercise of jurisdiction.21 At the same time, it is noteworthy that there are still some problems such 
as the limits of application of the nationality principle under these bilateral agreements and the 
lack of agreement on the regulation in the overlapping maritime areas of more than three countries 
in both of the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan. 
However, South Korea?s basic stance with respect to the delimitation of the continental 
shelf adjacent to the coast of Japan, which basically advocates the median line method, is based 
on the idea of natural prolongation, that is, that its outer limits beyond ??? nautical miles from its 
baselines ?are located in the Okinawa Trough?.22 This has been reconfirmed and rather enhanced by 
its recent Partial Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS)23 
soon after the China?s submission to the CLCS in December ????, both of which are based on the 
idea of natural prolongation in terms of the delimitation in the East China Sea.24 Therefore, the 
East China Sea is now a frontline in the conflict between the method of median line supported by 
the island state, Japan, and the natural-prolongation approach maintained by the continent states, 
South Korea and China.25
(3) Japan and China (with Taiwan)
The Senkaku/Diaoyudao/Diaoyutai Islands,26 which are currently occupied by Japan, are 
also claimed by China and Taiwan. Japan is of the view that there is no dispute over the Islands 
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since there is no doubt that they are an inherent part of Japan?s territory, in light of historical facts 
and based on international law. Under the ???? Joint Communique of the Government of Japan 
and the Government of the People?s Republic of China, Japan recognizes the Government of the 
People?s Republic of China ?as the sole legal Government of China? and ?fully understands and 
respects? China?s stand that ?Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the Government of 
People?s Republic of China?.27 Taiwan?s statehood and its historical and geographical positions 
make the dispute more complex. This is because China and Taiwan do not totally share one view 
with respect to either the dispute itself or their foreign policy towards Japan over the dispute. 
Therefore, this de facto double-standard regarding Japan, as well as Taiwan?s individualism, 
can be seen in the recent conclusion of an arrangement concerning joint fishery management 
which allows Taiwan?s trawlers to operate in a portion of Japan?s EEZ in the East China Sea.28 
Even though this practice may function as one of the leverages to the check against China?s 
maritime assertiveness in this maritime region, this pragmatic approach can be exemplified as a 
good model to overcome a similar case of territorial and maritime disputes.
Despite its apparently neutral attitude towards the territorial dispute, the United States has 
been, to a considerable degree, involved in the treatment and disposition of the Islands during the 
period between US occupation of Japan after the Second World War and the return of Okinawa 
islands to Japan in ????. The United States holds that it ?takes no position on the ultimate 
sovereignty of the Senkaku islands?,29 though it reaffirms the applicability of the ???? Japan-US 
Security Treaty to the Islands on the ground that the Islands are ?under the administration of Japan?.30 
This US position is certainly not acceptable to China, which considers that the Islands should have 
been returned to China with Taiwan on the ground that China?s sovereignty over the Islands were 
restored at the end of the US occupation of the Islands.31 Even this kind of neutral position held by 
a third party may afford ?some measure of support? to either side of party of the dispute.32
Since no mention was made of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty, this has led Japan and China to two conflicting positions. Japan, which incorporated the 
Senkaku Islands, previously considered terra nullius, into the Okinawa Prefecture by the Cabinet 
decision of ????, contends that the Senkaku is not included among the territories whose claim 
Japan renounced under the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Denying the terra nullius status of the 
Islands on the basis of their effective control, China and Taiwan are of the opinion that under the 
Peace Treaty, Japan renounced the Islands, which have long since been part of Taiwan.
Here, again, arises an issue as to the validity of Japan?s incorporation of the Islands in 
question into its own territory during a war period or in connection with war. In fact, international 
law does not seem to give any clear-cut general rule specifically applicable to similar cases 
as these. One can also see the legacy of the settlement and disposition of territories after the 
Second World War, with the United States? leading role in this process.33 In addition, actually, 
this settlement has so far turned out to be indefinite and tentative in terms of the territorial and 
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maritime settlement between the states concerned in the region. It is intriguing that the seemingly 
rushed work of the San Francisco Peace Settlement may eventually hold true for other territorial 
and maritime disputes that involve Japan as a concerned party.
As regards the legal status of the Islands, both countries? positions are in conflict with 
each other. Japan treats the Islands as the one entitled to have an EEZ and the continental shelf, 
while China denies this view for the reason that they are too small to ?sustain human habitation 
or economic life of their own?.34 This point is related to the Chinese position concerning the 
treatment of the Ryukyu Islands as the basis to effect the delimitation of the East China Sea. China 
is of the view that the natural prolongation of the land mass extends to the edge of the Okinawa 
Trough, where China?s continental shelf ends.35 On the other hand, Japan holds that the median 
line between the baselines of China?s coast and the ones of the Ryukyu Islands and other chains 
of islands that are spread from the mainland of Japan should be the boundary of their continental 
shelf in the East China Sea. China?s view is such partly because it would also question the 
Japanese ownership of the Ryukyu Islands (or Okinawa Islands), according to the background of 
Japan?s disposition of these Islands around the beginning of the Meiji Era.36
Since every single boundary case is distinct, however,37 each requires particular attention 
regarding the geographical and geophysical situations, the demographic situation, and some other 
relevant circumstances. Where the disparity of coastal lengths was considered, one may assume 
that the continental state?s coastlines will have an advantage over those of the island state (that 
is, the country with a chain of islands in question) because the provisional median line tends to 
be adjusted in accordance with the relative lengths of the relevant coastlines in order to reach an 
equitable result.38 What makes the delimitation more problematic is the territorial dispute between 
the two countries over sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, as mentioned above.
The cooperative atmosphere created by the ???? agreement on cooperation in joint 
development of a maritime area hovering around the theoretical median line in the East China Sea 
has been unfortunately wrecked. Moreover, Japan?s recent action in September ???? of purchasing 
some of the Islands from a private owner, which is often referred to as a ?nationalization? by Japan 
of the islands in question, has created gloomy prospects for bilateral relations as a whole. This 
caused two successive and related reactions of China with respect to Japan?s unilateral conduct 
that, for China, tremendously undermined the status quo based on the bilateral tacit agreement, 
the existence of which, Japan denies, though. These reactions are (?) China?s deposit to the UN 
Secretary General of a chart and a list of geographical coordinates of point with regard to the 
baselines for the territorial sea of the Islands upon its unilateral statement of ????39; and (?) its 
partial Submission to the CLCS concerning the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond ??? 
nautical miles in part of the East China Sea on the basis of its natural-prolongation approach.40
Here again arises an argument that in settling the territorial disputes and effecting maritime 
delimitation by way of the application and interpretation of international law, a particular view 
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point must be considered, and must specifically take account of the historical background of East 
Asia because most judicial and arbitral decisions concerning territorial acquisition and loss may 
not fully take account of the whole historical backgrounds underlying under the relations between 
former colonial powers and former colonies. This viewpoint tends to have much bearing upon the 
dispute in the South China Sea. This issue is far beyond the scope of this article, and the issues 
related to this have been discussed elsewhere.41 Therefore, the most essential point directly related 
with this article?s theme is that the viewpoint of China cannot easily be overcome unless the states 
concerned and the international society share the same historical recognition.
(4) The South China Sea42
Despite its ratification of the UNCLOS, China holds that the so-called ?nine-dotted line? in 
the South China Sea as drawn on a Chinese map has been historically and widely accepted, and 
that, accordingly, the line should not be evaluated by the UNCLOS because the latter cannot be 
retrospectively applied to the former. For these grounds, however, China?s historic right in this 
maritime area may contradict with contemporary international law.
An optimistic view concerning the Philippines? unilateral referral of a dispute with China 
to arbitration over the conflicts in the South China Sea, under Annex VII of the UNCLOS and 
its arbitral award of ???? may be very significant steps forward to enhance the idea of the rule 
of law in this region. This process and its outcome may be attractive for those who would like to 
use a third-party dispute settlement mechanism under the law of the sea including the UNCLOS. 
However, its consequences on the real solution of the dispute are yet to be seen, particularly when 
the world is impacted by the unprecedentedly capricious foreign policies pursued by recently 
elected leaders in the Philippines and in the United States.43 
It has been reported that China and the Philippines may have successfully agreed on a 
tentative deal over a fishery matter in the relevant maritime area as a result of the consequent 
summit meeting on the de facto shelving of the ???? award.
(5) South Korea and China
South Korea and China have conflicting views over the use of a high tide elevation 
in delimiting the EEZ between them. Since China is of the view that the theory of natural 
prolongation should be applied to both the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea, it does not 
recognize the Japan-South Korea joint development zone of their continental shelf in the East 
China Sea or their bilateral fishery agreement in the Sea. 
As regards the fishery zone, both countries have agreed upon establishing a joint fishery 
commission. However, the demarcation of this fishery zone in accordance with the equidistance 
line has been in conflict with China?s position on the use of its natural-prolongation approach, 
according to which China denies the Joint Development Zone and the shared fishery zone between 
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Japan and South Korea. 44
3. Conclusions 
In sum, recent developments in jurisprudence concerning territorial and maritime disputes 
seem to have limited implications for the settlement of similar disputes in East Asia. Some 
temporary thoughts will include the following practical realities. First, precedence concerning 
the territorial and maritime delimitation will be of limited value to the actual settlement of the 
dispute over the attribution of territorial sovereignty. As is often quoted from the ICJ?s famous 
pronouncement in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, ?the land dominates the sea?. There will, 
in principle, be no demarcation of territorial and/or maritime boundaries without first settling the 
dispute over a territorial sovereignty issue. Second, every geographical feature is distinct and may 
be unique. Third, a historic viewpoint may need to be considered as a decisive factor in some of 
the regions and areas in the international society, though this issue is not generally and squarely 
dealt with under the current framework of international law.
One may safely say that the provisional median line method implies the possibility of 
adjustment in accordance with special circumstances such as the disparity of coastal lengths of the 
parties concerned. Further, the idea of natural prolongation per se does not have a significant role 
to effect delimitation of maritime boundary, and that an island, regardless of its size, is entitled to 
the EEZ and the continental shelf. Therefore, the limits and limited implications of the judicial and 
arbitral decisions concerning the territorial and maritime disputes in this region are exemplified by 
the following three points.
First, one cannot deny an insightful observation made by a scholar with respect to the 
territorial and maritime disputes in East Asia that ?much of the uncertainty surrounding the 
territorial demarcation is a by-product of immediate post-World War II boundary decisions and 
territorial dispositions?.45 In order to settle the territorial disputes and, if necessary, to demarcate a 
boundary in the disputed maritime areas in this region, the abovementioned viewpoints regarding 
the historical facts and the foundation of contemporary international law should be duly addressed. 
The existence of and the considerable involvement of a third party, such as the United States, in 
the territorial disposition through agreements have caused some barriers to the dispute resolution 
process. This may be one of the reasons why the parties concerned to the disputes in question, 
China and South Korea in particular, are not willing to have recourse to a third-party mechanism 
of dispute settlement under international law. 
Contemporary international law may not necessarily reflect the historical background as a 
whole in the way that these countries wish. Recent judicial and arbitral case law does not, in their 
view, reflect historic factors such as colonialism in East Asia and the non-western perspective. 
How to overcome the legacy of the Second World War is still crucial in this region. In this sense, 
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one can say that, unless there is any agreement, the use of recent judgments will be limited in 
terms of the peaceful settlement of the territorial and maritime disputes in East Asia only through 
the strict application of contemporary international law.
Second, with regard to the countries involved in the territorial and maritime disputes in East 
Asia, it is peculiar that, basically, none of the claimant states can, without consent of the other state 
concerned, have recourse to third-party assistance for the settlement of the disputes, owing to the 
fundamental rule of international dispute settlement. For example, while Japan would be willing to 
use the ICJ, for instance, to settle the territorial disputes over the Northern Territories with Russia, 
and over the Takeshima with South Korea, it would have no intention to refer the territorial issue 
over the Senkaku to any dispute settlement mechanism. No occupying state would be willing 
to give consent to any invitation by the opponent state to settle the territorial dispute in a third-
party mechanism. Under these circumstances, therefore, consultation and negotiation between the 
parties concerned over the territorial and maritime disputes, if it occurs, would have limited use of 
the indication of recent judicial and arbitral precedence concerning this field of disputes.
Third, it is noteworthy that one wise and practical approach more widely utilised in East 
Asia to maintain relatively peaceful and cooperative relations with neighbouring states is that of 
virtually and de facto shelving the territorial disputes in order to gain immediate interests such as 
fishery rights through a mechanism of joint management of resources. Besides judicial and arbitral 
settlement, these pragmatic approaches will also merit elaboration among the states concerned in 
this region. However, this approach is possible only when an agreement is achieved between the 
states concerned in the dispute.
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